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ABSTRACT
We examine the link between equity risk premiums and demographic changes using a very long
sample over the twentieth century for the US, Japan, UK, Germany and France, and a shorter sample
covering the last third of the twentieth century for fifteen countries. We find that demographic
variables significantly predict excess returns internationally. However, the demographic
predictability found in the US by past studies for the average age of the population does not extend
to other countries. Pooling international data, we find that, on average, faster growth in the fraction
of retired persons significantly decreases risk premiums. This demographic predictability of risk
premiums is strongest in countries with well-developed social security systems and lesser-developed
financial markets.
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During the 1990’s, the baby boom generation (those born roughly in the two decades fol-
lowing World War II) entered its peak savings years. Individuals aged between 40 and 60 years
old are the prime savers of the economy in the US and this age class is projected to rise until
roughly 2010 and then decline. Several theoretical models have argued that the baby boom gen-
eration was a contributing factor to the high stock returns and the large increase in stock prices
observed from 1990 to 1999.1 Some, such as Abel (2001b), argue that as the baby boomers
retire, asset prices are likely to fall. Thus, understanding the effect the baby boomer cohort
has on current and future asset returns is important for economic policy, social planning and
social welfare issues. In this paper, we investigate the link between equity risk premiums and
demographic changes in several countries. We contribute to the debate on expected returns and
demography in a number of ways.
First, we construct long data samples covering most of the twentieth century for the largest
ﬁve developed countries (France, Germany, Japan, UK and US). In the US, there has been only
one baby boom shock in the past 40 years, but there have been demographic changes throughout
the whole twentieth century. Linking the increase in asset prices in the US with only the high
returns in the 1990’s may correspond to only one, non-representative, observation. Focusing on
this one observation opens up the possibility of data mining regarding inference of demographic
predictability of expected returns. Moreover, since demography is a slowly evolving variable,
testing for low-frequency changes in expected returns should be done with long time-series.
We use three explanatory variables to summarize dynamic demographic composition: the
average age of the population above 20 years old, the fraction of adults over age 65, and the
proportion of the population in the working ages 20-64. While levels of these variables are quite
highly correlated across countries, changes in these demographic measures and average returns
across the G5 countries are lowly correlated, so observing population changes and expected
returns in these markets gives extra information which effectively increases our sample size.
Second, we construct a fairly large cross-sectional sample of 15 countries, covering most of
the developed markets, similar to Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1997). This data covers the last
third of the twentieth century. While this second data set is much shorter, it provides a large
sample of cross-sectional variation in demographic experience and expected returns.
1 Mankiw and Weil (1989) make a similar argument trying to explain the rise of real estate prices in the late
1970’s and early 1980’s.
1Third, we use an econometric framework which adjusts for overlapping observations and
heteroskedasticity by using Hodrick (1992) standard errors. These standard errors have good
small sample properties and account for the moving average structure induced by using over-
lapping observations when looking at long-horizon returns (see Hodrick 1992; and Ang and
Bekaert 2001). Using standard OLS, Newey-West (1987) or Hansen-Hodrick (1980) standard
errors to judge predictability, especially over long horizons, may cause severe size biases. In
particular, improper inference leads to over-rejection of the null hypothesis of constant ex-
pected returns. If correct inference is made using appropriate standard errors, there is no reason
to restrict the data to be non-overlapping. Thus, our analysis uses all the available data, for
most efﬁcient estimation and most powerful tests. In contrast, Poterba (2001) uses 5-year non-
overlapping returns. We test predictability of the risk premium over horizons of 1 year, 2 years
and 5 years.
Finally, we pool the cross-sectional information of both our long time-series over the G5
countries and our larger sample of 15 countries to jointly estimate the predictability coefﬁcients.
In this procedure, we specify each country to have its own (constant) expected return as the
null hypothesis. We use the cross-sectional data to estimate the demographic predictability
coefﬁcients over several horizons, and conduct statistical inference with heteroskedastic-robust
standarderrors. Indeed, poolingthecross-sectionaldatasigniﬁcantlyincreasesstatisticalpower.
We ﬁnd that demographic changes do indeed predict risk premiums internationally. How-
ever, the particular relationship between changes in average age and risk premiums in the US,
which Bakshi and Chen (1994) and others ﬁnd, is unique to the US and is not replicated in
other countries. While changes in the average age of the population have no forecasting power
in international data, the change in the proportion of retired adults is a signiﬁcant predictor of
excess returns. However, unlike the US experience, increases in the retired proportion of the
population, as a fraction of the total adult population, decrease excess returns.
This result is somewhat surprising since retired people must ﬁnance their consumption en-
tirely from ﬁnancial wealth. Equities have larger aggregate risk, so the extant class of standard
overlappinggenerations(OLG)models(forexample, seeConstantinides, DonaldsonandMehra
2002), predict that retirees should diversify their holdings and hold largely risk-free assets. In
OLG models, when larger proportions of agents retire, they dis-save, and sell their assets not
bequeathed to the next generation to fund their consumption. If these agents affect asset prices
by selling their assets, asset prices would be pushed down and expected returns would increase.
2However, underspecialcircumstances, ourresultsmaybeconsistentwiththeoreticalmodels
with idiosyncratic labor shocks. For example, Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2001) extend the
Constantinides and Dufﬁe (1996) model with idiosyncratic labor risk to include a retirement
state for agents, where they receive no income shocks. In this extension, since retirees face no
labor market risk, they are less averse to bearing aggregate risk and hold substantial amounts
of equities. Such an economy with an increasing share of old people would see decreasing risk
premiums. Once Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron introduce trading between young, middle-aged
and old people, the portfolio implications look very similar to the standard OLG models, where
middle-aged people hold most of the equities and retirees sell equities and mostly hold bonds.
However, while the proportion of equities held by older people is substantially reduced, their
calibrations show that retirees can still hold up to 30% of their portfolios in equities. A future
extension of the Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2001) model to include demographic shifts
might show that a society with a growing fraction of elderly people could potentially lead to
decreasing risk premiums.
To further describe which characteristics of countries are driving the demographic pre-
dictability of risk premiums, we investigate if our results of increasing growth rates of retirees
decreasing future excess returns are related to different levels of social security beneﬁts or to
different levels of participation in securities markets across countries. These factors inﬂuence
the saving-investment choice of economic agents, especially retirees. We ﬁnd that the pattern
of demographic predictability is the same across countries with smaller or larger social security
beneﬁts, or well or less developed ﬁnancial markets. However, demographic predictability of
risk premiums is strongest for countries with larger social security beneﬁts and less developed
ﬁnancial markets. These are also countries where equity participation has traditionally been
low.
There have been few other empirical studies exploring the link between demography and
risk premiums, and most of these focus on the US.2 Some studies using international data in-
cludeErb, HarveyandViskanta(1997), Brooks(1998), Poterba(2001)andDavisandLi(2002).
Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1997) consider the predictability of demographic variables on asset
returns in a large cross-section of developed markets, but with a short time series. They focus
on predictability of total equity returns, rather than equity risk premiums, do not compute robust
standard errors, or pool cross-sectional data. Brooks (1998) examines demography and equity
2 See Bakshi and Chen (1994), Yoo (1994b), Bergantino (1998) and Goyal (2002).
3prices in the OECD nations over the post-war time period, but focuses on asset price levels
rather than returns. Using information from the Survey of Consumer Finances, Poterba (2001)
investigates the relationship between age and the demand for ﬁnancial assets. His analysis is
mainly limited to the US, but in the last part of the paper he explores time-series relationships
between demographic change and asset returns in Canada and the UK, and ﬁnds little evidence
of predictability of asset returns by demographic variables in these countries. All these studies
do not conduct pooled cross-sectional estimations using international data over long horizons,
nor do they compute robust standard errors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical and
empirical framework. Section 3 describes the data and shows how pooling international data
leads to improvements in power. Section 4 presents the core ﬁndings on the demographic pre-
dictability of risk premiums. In Section 5, we examine the relationship between demography,
social security and the relative degree of ﬁnancial market development. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical and Empirical Framework
2.1 Theoretical Motivation
The impact of demographic factors on asset prices has usually been theoretically modelled us-
ing an OLG framework.3 We brieﬂy outline two recent examples of this literature to show how
demographic changes can be related to the equity premium. Our exposition also highlights sev-
eral ways in which demographic variables can impact risk premiums not generally considered
in the simple theoretical models, but which we include in our empirical work.
The ﬁrst example is Donaldson and Maddaloni (2002), who extend the OLG model of Con-
stantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (2002) to include an exogeneous and ﬁxed population growth
rate n. Each generation born into the economy lives for three periods: young, middle-aged and
old (or retired). The fraction of young people in the population is an increasing function of
n, while the fraction of middle-aged and of old people are inversely related to its value. This
allows different values of the population growth rate to give rise to different age distributions of
the population. There are two ﬁnancial assets, equity and risk-free bonds, in the economy and
3 See the OLG models of Yoo (1994a), Brooks (2002a and b), Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (1998),
Abel (2001a and 2001b, 2003), Donaldson and Maddaloni (2002), Luo (2000) and Goyal (2002).
4their supply also grows at the same rate n as the population.4
Calibrated simulations of the model show that the risk premium is a decreasing function
of n, but the effect of demographic changes on the value of the risk premium is generally
small. The rationale behind this result is that equity become less attractive relative to bonds
as population growth rises, because dividends in the Donaldson and Maddaloni (2002) model
are a residual payment after subtracting wages and bond interest payments from output. As
population growth rises, the claim of young people on output through wages increases, causing
dividends to fall and causing equity to become less attractive than bonds. Hence, the required
equity premium decreases.
This result is qualitatively similar to Brooks (2002a), who models a production-based econ-
omy rather than an exchange-based economy. In Brooks’ model, agents live for four periods:
childhood, young working age, old working age, and retirement. Young workers provide for
their own consumption as well as for their children. In retirement, agents consume their savings
and receive social security beneﬁts indexed to current wages. The economy has two assets, a
risk-free bond and risky capital, and the aggregate population growth rate is stochastic. Cali-
brating the model to match the US baby boom, Brooks forecasts that as the baby boomers retire,
returns on both stocks and bonds are driven down by approximately 100 basis points. The ef-
fects of demographic change on risk premiums are very small, though, because of the low risk
premium in the Brooks (2002a) model. Imposing borrowing constraints on young people, like
those imposed by Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (2002), can increase the risk premium
substantially to the value observed in data (see Brooks 2002b).
The OLG models all share the feature that demographic shocks affect asset returns even in
economies where rational agents anticipate future population growth. Another general charac-
teristic of OLG models incorporating demographic changes is the assumption that people sell
their ﬁnancial assets in order to consume when retired. In this framework, an ageing population
generally implies a decrease of asset prices (both equity and bonds) and an increase of required
expected excess returns. In Abel (2001b), a bequest motive is included in the model, but this is
shown not to overturn the basic conclusions, at least for generally accepted calibrations.
Populationdynamicscanpotentiallydrivetheriskpremiuminseveraladditionalwaysrather
4 Despite this latter assumption, aggregate population growth rates still affect the value of risk premiums. Re-
laxing the link between the supply of ﬁnancial assets and population growth rates potentially produces even larger
effects.
5than just focusing on shocks to aggregate population growth. While Donaldson and Maddaloni
(2002) assume that total population growth determines the cross-sectional population proﬁle, in
reality, it is possible that total population growth may be only one determinant of changes in the
cross-sectional age proﬁle of the population due to immigration and other channels. Changes
in the demographic cross-section may have large effects on ﬁnancial prices.
The existence of a relationship between equity premiums and cross-sectional population dis-
tribution is also theoretically supported in models incorporating some aspects of social security.
For example, Campbell et al. (2001) assume that during working years, an individual must save
a fraction of current labor income as illiquid retirement wealth that is converted into a riskless
annuity after retirement. In this model, returns on ﬁnancial assets are crucially affected by the
relative proportions of working people and retirees. Goyal (2002) also shows that inﬂows (net
new investments) in the stock market are directly related to changes, rather than static levels, in
the demographic structure of the population.
In our empirical work, we examine several measures of different cohort growth rates in
the demographic cross-sectional proﬁle. In particular, we investigate the empirical relationship
between excess returns and the growth of the fraction of people belonging to the age classes of
the middle-aged (working) and old. Statistically, levels of demographic variables are also unit
root, while changes of growth rates of demographic variables are more stationary. Hence, we
examine log changes in the demographic variables of interests as predictors of risk premium.
We denote these variables with “d” preﬁxes.
Risk aversion itself may depend on demographic variables. Bakshi and Chen (1994), for
example, ﬁnd empirical evidence that an investor’s relative risk aversion increases with age.
While earlier studies based on the Survey of Consumer Finances, like Lampman (1962), found
similar evidence, more recent work ﬁnds richer results at a cross-sectional level. In particu-
lar, Poterba (2001) ﬁnds supporting evidence that age is indeed related to risk tolerance, but
this relationship is not monotonic. This might suggest that simple summary measures used by
previous authors, such as the average age and the median age of the population may not be
appropriate when studying the impact of demographics on asset pricing. These aggregate mea-
sures may also mask changes in cross-sectional population structure. In contrast, we also use
several different cohort population measures as predictor variables.
Demographic changes may affect asset returns through several indirect ways. For example,
Abel (2001b) comments that demography affects the composition of agents in the economy
6and their risk-sharing abilities. Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) show that households’ portfolios
vary with age, so demography is related to limited equity participation and non-participation,
which affects expected returns and return variability, as Allen and Gale (1994) demonstrate. To
further examine the relationship between demography and risk premiums, we examine how de-
mographic predictability may change across countries with different social security systems
(economies with different risk-sharing proﬁles) and different ﬁnancial market development
(economies with different ﬁnancial market participation). Even in small open countries (like
Australia and Belgium, for example), we might expect that demography is related to risk pre-
miums, since even in these countries there is a pronounced home-bias, and low stock market
participation (see, for example, Tesar and Werner 1995; and Guiso, Haliasos and Jappelli 2000).
2.2 Empirical Framework
In order to empirically investigate the relationship between expected returns and demographic
variables we run regressions of the form:
Et [yt+1] = ® + ¯
0
zt: (1)
yt+1 is the log excess return in period (t + 1), calculated as the difference between the contin-
uously compounded total return of the stock market index and the continuously compounded
return on a risk-free asset, and zt includes demographic variables and other, non demographic
known predictor variables. We work with several demographic measures. The ﬁrst is the frac-
tion of people over 65 years old, called %age65, a proxy for the percentage of retired people;
the second is the percentage of people in the age class [20-64], called %working, a proxy for the
work force population. We consider also the average age of adult population, called age, calcu-
lated as the weighted average age of individuals over 20 years old, which is the same measure
Bakshi and Chen (1994) employ.
Under the null that ¯ = 0 in equation (1), expected excess returns are constant. To empiri-
cally test the predictability of the equity premium over k periods we use the regression:
˜ yt+k = ® + ¯
0zt + ²t+k;k (2)
where ˜ yt+k = (1=k)(yt+1 + yt+2 + ¢¢¢ + yt+k) is the annualized k-period excess return for the
aggregate stock market, where all annual excess returns yt+1 are continuously compounded.
The error terms ²t+k;k have an MA(k ¡ 1) form because of over-lapping observations.
7We ﬁrst run regressions with only one explanatory demographic variable. In this ﬁrst set of
regressions, zt in equation (2) is either zt = daget¡1, zt = d%age65t¡1, or zt = d%workingt¡1,
the annual growth rates of the demographic variables. The RHS variables are lagged by one
year to ensure they are observable at time t. The literature has found other predictor variables,
which have proved to explain movements in equity returns. In a second set of regressions,
we control for other explanatory variables on the RHS of (2) by adding consumption growth
dconst and the term spread termt, the difference between a long-term yield and a short-term
yield. In the standard consumption-asset pricing framework, asset returns are a function of
consumption growth, so following Bakshi and Chen (1994) we include dconst as a control
variable. This variable is also lagged one year to ensure that it is in the information set at time
t. Keim and Stambaugh (1986) and Campbell (1987) ﬁnd that the term spread is a predictor of
risk premiums, so we also include the lagged term spread termt in zt. The term spread also
represents the difference in expected intertemporal marginal rates of substitution over long and
short horizons (see Harvey 1988). While the literature has found other predictor variables, these
cannot be obtained for the very long sample period (almost a century) and for the entire set of
countries that we consider.
For hypothesis testing, we compute standard errors using the method in Hodrick (1992),
which accounts for both the moving average errors and for heteroskedasticity. Using GMM, the
parameters µ = (®¯0)
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8As Ang and Bekaert (2001) and others report, Hodrick (1992) standard errors do not over-
reject the null of no-predictability, which OLS, Newey-West (1987) and Hansen and Hodrick
(1980) t-statistics do. This feature is critical, especially for long horizon studies. Ang (2002)
reports that the true size for a Newey-West standard error may be over 40%, when the nominal
size is 5%, for long horizons. If we were to use non-Hodrick (1992) standard errors, we would
not know if a rejection of the null in favor of predictability would be due to over-rejections of the
null hypothesis, or actually reﬂects a true predictive relationship in line with a given conﬁdence
level. The size distortions of Hodrick (1992) standard errors are minimal, ensuring we do not
capture spurious predictability relations.
In order to increase power, we pool cross-sectional data across countries. In particular, we
estimate a pooled version of regression (2) but impose cross-sectional restrictions, following
the method in Ang and Bekaert (2001). In particular, we estimate the equation:
˜ y
i
t+k = ®i + ¯
0
izt + ²i;t+k (7)
for each country i subject to ¯i = ¯ ¯ across different countries. Under the null hypothesis of
constant excess returns, this speciﬁcation allows each country to have its own individual mean
excess return. We pool data by imposing the restriction that the age structure of the population
has an impact of the same magnitude on the equity premium in different countries. Appendix B
shows how to estimate this system and how to compute Hodrick (1992) standard errors for ¯ ¯.
In the second part of the study, we use monthly data for 15 countries. We place annual-
ized monthly returns over 1, 2 and 5 years horizons on the LHS of equation (2). In this case,
e yt+k = (12=k)(yt+1 + ::: + yt+k) where yt+1 now represent monthly excess returns. Since our
demographic data has an annual frequency, we use the population variable in zt which corre-
sponds to the last annual number at the start of the calendar year. (The demographic variables
are again lagged by one year to ensure that they are time t measurable). Hence, there are 12
identical observations for zt; zt+1, :::, zt+11 over the calendar year starting from time t. The
same exact procedure is applied to annual data on aggregate consumption.
3 Data
Our empirical analysis uses two data sets. The ﬁrst data set spans slightly more than the twen-
tieth century for the US, France, Germany and UK (1900-2001) and from 1920 to 2001 for
9Japan. This data set consists of annual observations on excess aggregate equity returns, several
demographic variables, consumption growth and term spread predictors. Section 3.1 describes
the US time-series while Section 3.2 compares the US experience with the other G5 countries.
In the second data set, we consider a much larger range of countries but a more restricted time
period covering the latter third of the last century, 1970 to 2000. We have monthly observations
for the following 15 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the
United States. One concern about using international data is that since the broad demographic
trends are shared by major countries, pooling information across countries may not dramatically
increase power. In Section 3.3, we show that since the cross-country variations in changes in
demographic growth rates are lowly correlated, pooling data from ﬁve countries gives almost
the same power as increasing the sample size of the US by ﬁve times.
3.1 Description of Annual US Data
Figure 1 displays the three US measures of demographic changes we consider: age, the average
age of the population over 20, %age65, the percentage of adult people aged 65 or higher; and
%working, the proportion of the population which is aged [20-64]. We report the levels for
these variables in the left column of Figure 1 while the right column shows the continuously
compoundedannualchangeofthesevariables, whicharedenotedwitha“d”preﬁx. Theaverage
age of the adult population is increasing for the whole sample except for the decade 1960-70.
The percentage of people over 65 years old rises over the whole last century, although the slope
of the graph is lower in the second half of the century. The percentage of the population in the
[20-64] working age class increases until the 1950’s, then it decreases and starts to rise again
after 1970.
These plots all highlight the same phenomenon: the effect of the baby boom generation,
a higher than average increase in the birth rate of United States recorded in the period 1950-
1960. The fraction of people in the workforce dropped during those years, because there was a
larger number of new babies. In addition, since the average age is calculated using the whole
population over 20 years old, the variable dage shows a sharp decline after 1970, exactly when
the baby boom generation enters into the calculation of the average. The fraction of adult people
over age 65 increases at a lower rate in the last ten years: people from the baby boom generation
are not yet retired which implies a larger proportion of the population in the younger age classes.
10Hence, the proportion of the older age class grows at a slower rate. Demographers forecast a
reversal of this phenomenon in the very short future when the baby boom generation retires.
The ﬁrst two columns of Panel A of Table 1 report summary statistics for the US of the
demographic variables and asset returns over the full sample. The average age of the US popu-
lation over the last century is 43, but the average age has increased from 41 in the ﬁrst half of
the century (1900-1945) to 45 from 1946-2001. The proportion of retired people as a fraction
of the adult population averages 12% across the century, but this has increased on average by
nearly 1 percent (0.89%) per year. In contrast, the proportion of the working population has
stayed at roughly the same level across the century (around 56%). The levels of the demo-
graphic variables age, %age65 and %working are highly autocorrelated (over 0.99 in the full
sample). On the other hand, the log changes of these variables are more stationary: for example,
the autocorrelation of dage is 0.91 in the full sample.5
We calculate the excess return (“excess”) on the US market as the difference between the
continuously compounded total return (price appreciation and dividend return) of the S&P 500
and the continuously compounded return on a short term risk-free asset. Panel A reports some
well known stylized facts on the excess return. US excess returns over the last century are on
average 5.22% and have a volatility of 19.53% over the whole sample.
The last two rows of Panel A report summary statistics of the two additional regressors we
use in our predictive regressions. The ﬁrst, the US term spread (“term”) is calculated as the
difference between the long term bond yield and the short term yield. The average term spread
is 1.41% over the entire sample. The second, is the log change in consumption, dcons. Average
US consumption growth is around 3.28% with a volatility of 5.45%.
The US correlation matrix reported in Panel B of Table 1 contains several interesting styl-
ized facts. First, as expected, the demographic variables are correlated with each other: while
the correlation is positive between dage and d%age65 (0.58), the variable d%working is neg-
atively correlated with both of them (-0.74 and -0.54 respectively). This is because dage and
d%age65 are both measures of population aging and a population with an increasing number of
retired people means fewer people in the workforce as a proportion of total population. Second,
we conﬁrm that demographic variables are signiﬁcantly correlated with the risk-free return, as
5 For the US variables age, %age65 and %working, we cannot reject the null of a unit root using Dickey-Fuller
tests. We also cannot reject the null of a unit root for US dage, d%age65 and d%working because of lack of power.
However, the dage, d%age65 and d%working variables for the other G5 countries are statistically stationary.
11Poterba (2001) ﬁnds. In contrast, the correlations between the excess returns and the demo-
graphic variables are much lower and go in the opposite direction to the correlations with the
risk-free rates. Hence, there is some unconditional relation between demographic variables and
asset returns in US data.
3.2 Description of Annual G5 Data
In Figure 2, we present plots of the demographic variables age, %age65 and %working across
the US, UK, France, Germany and Japan. While the US, UK, France and Germany share the
same broad trends, Japan’s experience is quite different. However, even within these broad
trends, the demographic experiences of each individual country are also different from each
other. We illustrate this with one variable, age, in detail.
In the UK, the average age increases steadily until 1980 and then starts to decrease, possibly
due to a high rate of immigration. The pattern in France is less clear: although the trend is
increasing, there are several peaks (corresponding to 1921, 1938 [the effect of World War II]
and 1966) and downturns (corresponding to 1931, 1939 and 1980). In Germany, the average
age of the adult population above 20 years rises at a high rate after World War II, and it starts to
slow down during the 1950’s. There is a decrease in the 1980’s, which may be due to increased
foreign immigration. Recently, the average age has started to increase again. In Japan, the
average age starts to increase only after 1970. Before this, the age structure of the population is
much more stable. After 1970, the increase is quite sharp until the last decade, when the value
of the average age stabilizes at a higher level. This observation is consistent, for example, with
the fact that only recently has the Japanese government relaxed its immigration policies toward
foreign citizens, in particular allowing descendants of Japanese ancestors to emigrate back to
Japan.
Panel A of Table 1 lists summary statistics for the G5 countries. Turning ﬁrst to the demo-
graphic variables, the US has a relatively younger population than the UK, Germany, France
and Japan. While, on average over the last century, 12% of the US and the Japanese adult pop-
ulation is above age 65, 14% of the UK and German adult population and 16% of the French
adult population is above retirement age. Compared to the other G5 countries, the US has a
fairly fast rate of increase in the demographic variables. The US has a fast average increase
(0.89%) in the proportion of the adult population over 65, and only Japan’s population has a
faster average increase (1.47%). France’s population shows the slowest rate of aging: its means
12of dage, d%age65 and d%working are uniformly the lowest across the ﬁve countries. Mean ex-
cess returns range from 3.02% for Germany (with a 26.24% volatility) to 6.89% in Japan (with
a 24.37% volatility).
PanelCofTable1listscorrelation matricesacrosscountriesfor dage, d%age65, d%working
and excess. While Figure 2 shows that population levels have broad trends across the G5, Panel
C shows that growth rates in the cross-sectional population are lowly correlated. Hence, the US
experiences in population growth rates have not been shared by the UK, Germany, France and
Japan. The cross-country correlations for dage, d%age65 and d%working are generally low.
Japan’s dage is generally negatively correlated with the Western countries, but even in Europe
the rate of change of the average age is not uniform (the UK-French correlation is close to zero).
The US and UK correlation of d%age65 is high at 73%, but the correlation of the growth of the
fraction of the US population above retirement age is only 8% with France and is signiﬁcantly
negatively correlated with Japan (-50%). The cross-country correlations for d%working have
the same signs as those for d%age65 and are also fairly low. Turning ﬁnally to cross-country
correlations of the excess return, the highest cross-country correlation is the US-UK (53%). The
US excess return has only a 25% and 35% correlation with France and Germany, and only a
14% correlation with Japan.
In summary, the demographic experiences of cross-sectional changes and excess return pat-
terns of the G5 countries over the past century are generally lowly correlated. This implies that
the time-series data of other countries contain valuable cross-sectional information which we
will exploit by cross-sectional pooling. To explicitly show the increase in power by exploiting
the cross-country information, we now conduct a simulation exercise to examine the increase
in power by using data from foreign countries.
3.3 Does Adding Cross-Country Data Increase Power?
Table 1 shows that changes in demographic variables across countries are lowly correlated. We
show that this low correlation allows us to increase statistical power by pooling data across
countries. To illustrate this, we work with a univariate predictive regression of the form:
yt = ® + ¯xt¡1 + ¾yut; (8)
for a predictive instrument xt forecasting the variable yt (in our case the excess return) and ut »
IID N(0,1). To examine power in small samples, we work with the framework of Stambaugh
13(1999), so that xt is an endogenous regressor:
xt = ½xt¡1 + ¾x²t; (9)
where ²t » IID N(0,1).
Our strategy is as follows. We use the data-generating process (DGP) of (8) and (9) to
simulate out data from one country (the US), of 99 years, the same length as our G5 one-period
ahead regression sample. We simulate out under the alternative that ¯ 6= 0, and re-estimate the
predictive regression (8) (which corresponds to (2) with k = 1) in the small sample and record
the Hodrick (1992) t-statistic. Using critical values corresponding to 10% and 5% nominal
size levels (for two-sided tests), we record the proportion of rejections of the null hypothesis.
Our goal is to see the improvement in power by increasing the US sample to 2 £ 99, 3 £ 99,
4 £ 99 and 5 £ 99 years. We compare this to the power of pooling the data from 2, 3, 4 and 5
‘average’ countries, which are correlated with the US sample. The pooled regression (7) data is
re-estimated in each simulated sample, where each country has a sample length of 99.
Our calibrated values for the DGP are determined as follows. We set ½ = 0:94, from the
autocorrelation of d%age65 for the US, ¾x = 0:0024 giving xt an unconditional volatility of
0:007, as in US data. We conduct our power analysis under the null hypothesis that ¯ = 0 and
under the alternative hypothesis that ¯ = ¡2:1, which is the empirical value of the regression
(detailed in Section 4). We set ¾y = 0:23, which is the average volatility of the G5 excess
returns, slightly higher than the volatility of the US excess return (0.20). Panel B of Table 1
shows the unconditional correlation in the US of excess returns and d%age65 is 0.05, which we
set as the correlation of ut and ²t under the null. In Panel C of Table 1, the average cross-country
correlation of US d%age65 and d%age65 in other countries is 0.38, excluding Japan, and we
set the correlation of US shocks to d%age65 and shocks to foreign excess returns at zero.
Table 2 lists the results of the small sample power analysis. First, power is fairly low,
with power being only 17.29% (10.59%) for a 10% (5%) nominal size level for using only US
data. This is because the volatility of excess returns is very high, 23%, relative to the variation
caused by the predictable components due to demographic variables. Hence, trying to pick up
demographic predictability of risk premiums is very difﬁcult even with samples of a century of
data without pooling or further increasing the data sample. Second, power naturally increases
as the data sample for the US is increased from 99 years to 495 years. Increasing the data
sample of a single country by a factor of ﬁve increases power to 45.75% (33.45%) at a 10%
(5%) nominal size level.
14Third, we see that the increases in power for using pooled cross-country information is al-
most the same for increasing the sample length of the US. For example, at a 5% level, using data
from three countries produces a power of 21.15% which is almost exactly the same power as in-
creasing the data sample of the US alone by three times (21.38%). For ﬁve countries, the power
corresponding to a size level of 5% is 31.46%, only slightly less than increasing the US data
sample by a factor of ﬁve (33.45%). Power from using cross-country information is lower than
simply increasing the US data sample because the demographic information across countries
is correlated. However, the loss in power from using cross-country information is almost neg-
ligible, compared to increasing the US data sample, because the correlations of demographic
changes across countries are low (see Panel C of Table 1). In summary, cross-country pool-
ing is a very good way to increase power for examining the relationship between demographic
variables and excess returns.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Demographic Predictability in the US
Table 3 reports the results of the regression in equation (2) for the US over the full sample
1900-2001. We present forecast horizons of the excess return over 1 year, 2 years and 5 years.
For each horizon, we list the results of univariate regressions of changes of each demographic
variable dage, d%age65 and d%working. We include the two predictors dcons and term as
control variables in trivariate regressions with each demographic variable.
Table 3 shows very weak predictability, generally not even signiﬁcant at the 10% level,
for the risk premium by any demographic variable. In one sense, this is consistent with many
theoretical studies who ﬁnd only weak relationships between demographic effects and risk pre-
miums. The point estimates show that a 1 basis point increase in the average adult age in-
creases the risk premium by 16 basis points at a 1-year horizon. Controlling for dcons and term,
d%age65 is signiﬁcant at the 10% level at a 1-year horizon but produces an R2 of only 3.90%.
The point estimates are consistent with Bakshi and Chen (1994), and other US studies, who ﬁnd
that a change in the average age is positively related to future risk premiums. However, with
robust standard errors and a larger sample period, our predictability evidence is weak. We now
check the robustness of the relationship between population changes and risk premiums with
15international data.
4.2 Demographic Predictability Across the G5 Countries
The regression results over the full sample are reported in Tables 4 and 5 for the UK and Japan.
We comment (but do not report) on the regression results for France and Germany below. Table
6 reports results of a joint regression estimated cross-sectionally across all G5 countries.
We turn ﬁrst to the UK in Table 4. For a 1-year horizon, the point estimates of the coef-
ﬁcients of dage, d%age65 and d%working have the same sign as the US. However, the UK
dage coefﬁcient is one order of magnitude less than the US and becomes negative over longer
forecast horizons. Like the US results, d%working is not a signiﬁcant predictor at any horizon.
The demographic variable which does have signiﬁcant predictive power for excess returns is
d%age65, which is positive and signiﬁcant over all horizons (signiﬁcant at the 1% (5%) level
for a 1-year (2-year and 5-year) horizon). In particular, a 1% change in d%age65 increases the
equity premium by around 3-4% at all horizons. These are almost the same point estimates
as for the US, except that the US point estimates are all insigniﬁcant across all horizons. The
change in the proportion of retired persons also retains its signiﬁcance controlling for dcons and
term in the trivariate regression.
Table 5 reports the results of the predictive regressions for Japan, which are run over the
period 1920-2001. The demographic coefﬁcients are all signiﬁcant at the 1-year horizon, but
are exactly the opposite sign to the US regressions. For the 1-year horizon in the univariate
regressions, dage, d%age65 and d%working are all signiﬁcant at the 5% level. However, con-
trolling for dcons and term, the predictability of each of these demographic variables diminishes
so that the only signiﬁcant predictor controlling for these instruments is d%age65. At 2-year
and 5-year horizons, no demographic variable is a signiﬁcant predictor.
For the regressions for France and Germany, there is no evidence of predictability at the
5% level, but some predictability at the 10% level. We might have expected that France and
Germany would give similar results as the US. However, this is not the case. For short horizons,
the point estimates of the demographic for France and Germany have the same sign as Japan,
which is exactly opposite to the US coefﬁcients. Overall, this suggests that any relation between
expected returns and demographic variables may be different in international data to the US
experience.
The ﬁrst conclusion to draw from these results is that demographic variables do predict
16excess returns in international data, at least in the UK and Japan. This evidence is much stronger
than US data. Second, the demographic variable which other authors have found to predict
excess returns in the US (change in the average age of the population with a positive sign) is
not a result that extends to other countries. In other countries d%age65 is the best demographic
predictor of excess returns, and it is highly signiﬁcant. Third, the sign of the coefﬁcients on
the demographic instruments are different in the US than from other countries. The variable
d%age65 predicts excess returns in some countries with the same sign as the US (the UK) or
with the opposite sign to the US (France and Germany). Japan has exactly the opposite results
of demographic predictability of risk premiums to the US.
Toincreasethepowerofthetests, wepooldataacrossallG5countriesandestimateequation
(7) constraining the demographic variables to have the same coefﬁcients in each country, but
allow each country to have different constant excess returns under the null of no predictability.
We introduce a dummy variable to account for the years of the World Wars, where data points
are missing for several countries. Our sample period is 1920-2001, since the Japanese data
starts in 1920.
Table 6 reports the results of the pooled regression across the G5 countries. In the regres-
sions at the 1-year horizon, both dage and d%age65 have negative coefﬁcients. These results
are the opposite to those obtained estimating only with US data. The variable d%working has a
negative sign at short horizons, but turns positive at long horizons. Across all horizons, only the
Hodrick (1992) t-statistic of d%age65 is signiﬁcant at a 5% level in the regressions controlling
for dcons and term. The d%age65 coefﬁcient increases its signiﬁcance to the 1% level at the
5-year horizon. In particular, at a 1-year (5-year) horizon, for a 1% increase in the percentage
of the adult population which is retired, the risk premium is forecasted to decrease by 2.12%
(1.34%), controlling for the effects of predictability by consumption growth and term spreads.
The pattern of increases in d%age65 driving reductions in the risk premium is largely due to
the relationship between excess returns and the ageing of the populations in France, Germany
and Japan. In these countries, it is d%age65 which has most predictive power, with a negative
sign, rather than positive sign as in the US regression. Hence, while demographic predictability
in the US is very weak, it is much stronger in international data. Furthermore, the weak positive
correlation between excess returns and the average age of population in the US is not a robust
empirical phenomenon which other countries share. Across the G5 countries, it is the change
of the fraction of retired people which has most predictive power for excess returns, with a
17negative sign.
4.3 Demographic Predictability Across Fifteen Countries
Figure 3 shows the coefﬁcients of the demographic variables with 95% conﬁdence bounds from
trivariate regressions over the 1-year forecast horizon. In each regression we control for dcons
and term using monthly data. Each country is abbreviated by a code in the x-axis. Panel A
shows the coefﬁcients of dage, where every country except Spain and the US has insigniﬁcant
coefﬁcients. The US coefﬁcient is roughly twice the magnitude across this shorter 30-year
subsample, as over the full century, and is now signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This is a much
stronger result than over the full century in Table 3.
Panel B shows the coefﬁcient d%age65. In contrast to the full sample, the point estimate of
the US coefﬁcient is negative, although the standard error is very large. With the exception of
the UK, every country has negative point estimates. Italy and Spain are signiﬁcantly negative at
the 5% level, but many countries, including Australia, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, and
Sweden are signiﬁcantly negative at the 10% level. Panel C of Figure 3 shows the regression
coefﬁcients of d%working. Most countries have positive coefﬁcients, many of them signiﬁcant,
while the US has a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient.
Table 7 reports pooled cross-country regression results for the ﬁfteen countries. The coef-
ﬁcients for d%age65 and d%working have the same sign as the joint regressions over the G5
countries in Table 6. The most signiﬁcant demographic variable for the US, dage, is not sig-
niﬁcant at any horizon, but the positive sign is the same as in the US regressions. However,
the pooled country estimation over 15 countries supports the hypothesis that there is a negative
correlation between the growth in the fraction of the adult population over 65 years old and
future excess equity returns.
In Table 7, d%age65 is signiﬁcant at the 1% level in univariate regressions for all horizons,
and controlling for dcons and term, d%age65 remains signiﬁcant at the 1% level across all
horizons. Looking at the point estimates, at a 1-year horizon, increasing the growth of the
fraction of the adult population over 65 by 1% decreases the equity premium by 4.11% (2.31%)
at a 1-year (5-year) horizon, controlling for dcons and term. Turning ﬁnally to d%working, this
variable is also not signiﬁcant at the 5% level over any horizon, controlling for consumption
growth and the term spread. The positive signs on d%working are the opposite of the US
coefﬁcients.
18Hence, theresultsofamuchlargersampleconﬁrmthattheUSexperiencewithdemographic
change and excess returns does not conform to international experience. While demographic
variables signiﬁcantly predict excess returns, the US demographic variables are not the same
variables which predict excess returns internationally, nor do they even predict with the same
sign. Internationally, increases in the proportion of retired people decrease risk premiums.
5 Demography, Social Security and Market Development
There may be several reasons why the US risk premium predictability by demographic vari-
ables is different from the experiences of other countries. First, structural differences among
the ﬁnancial system of the United States and other developed countries might partly explain
the differences in the results. For example, as shown in Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra
(2002), the presence or absence of the young as ﬁnancial market participants substantially in-
ﬂuences equilibrium security returns. The degree of participation in the equity market and the
ability to borrow against human capital may be quite different across the countries considered
in the sample. Second, the US generally has lower social security beneﬁts and a much more es-
tablished equity culture than other countries. The existence of “more generous” social security
systems may also affect portfolio allocation between risky and riskless assets.
In this section, we examine if the demographic predictability of the risk premium differs
across countries due to differences in social security systems and the relative degree of the de-
velopment of ﬁnancial markets. We use the same technique of pooled cross-country regressions,
but divide our group of countries into two subgroups, depending on the institutional character-
istics of each country. Our motivation here is to further examine which characteristics of the
countries are behind the strong predictability of excess returns by demographic changes.
5.1 Social Security Beneﬁts
In international data, we ﬁnd that the greater the change in the proportion of people over 65, the
lower the risk premium, both for the G5, and for the larger sample of 15 developed countries.
For this age class, as well as middle-aged investors saving for retirement, investment choices
are likely to be affected by the amount of social security beneﬁts that households receive dur-
ing retirement and by the expected variability of these beneﬁts, as perceived when investors
are middle-aged. To see if cross-country differences in social security affect the relationship
19between demography and expected returns, we divide countries into two groups, depending on
how “socially developed” the country is.
We construct an indicator of “social security development” using data from the OECD So-
cial Expenditure Database. This indicator captures the percentage of public expenditures which
represents beneﬁts for retired people. These beneﬁts are the sum of “old age cash beneﬁts”
and “services for the elderly and the disabled.” The indicator of Social Security beneﬁts is con-
structed as follows:
ISS =
(old age cash beneﬁt) + (services for the elderly and the disabled)
(total public expenditures) £ (percentage of people over 65)
: (10)
The indicator is divided by the percentage of people over 65 in order to correct for the size
of the “old population.” This value is greater than one for most of the countries we consider,
which implies that the percentage of social expenses directed to the old population is higher
than the percentage of people over 65. The ﬁfteen countries are then divided in two groups,
split according to the median value of the averages of (10) for each country. Panel A of Table
8 lists the two groups. The groups are as expected, with Switzerland and Italy appearing as the
two countries with the highest level of social security beneﬁts, except that Canada and Sweden
appear as the countries with the least beneﬁts. This might be due to the fact that in the OECD
data, health beneﬁts paid cannot be separated into beneﬁts paid only for old people, so Canada
and Sweden are most likely severely under-ranked.6 Nevertheless, the ranking provides a ﬁrst-
cut look at the generosity of social security beneﬁts.
Panel B of Table 8 reports the results of the two pooled cross-country regressions. We
report only the demographic coefﬁcient in the trivariate regression (and omit the coefﬁcients
on dcons and term). The most interesting result is that d%age65 is a signiﬁcant predictor,
with a negative sign, for both groups of countries at all horizons. However, d%age65 is a more
signiﬁcant predictor, with larger magnitudes of the point estimates of the regression coefﬁcients,
for high beneﬁt countries than for low beneﬁt countries. This result is intuitive: in countries
with low social security beneﬁts, retirees are forced to dis-save some of their wealth to fund
their consumption, and the demographic predictability of d%age65 is muted. In contrast, in
countries with high social security beneﬁts, old people participate in ﬁnancial markets not to
6 A second indicator adds health £ (percentage of people over 65) to the numerator in (10). The regression re-
sults obtained including health expenses are very similar to the results obtained when health expenses are excluded
in (10).
20sell securities to fund their retirement, but may save for other purposes like bequest motives and
pure speculation, and hence may more directly affect equity premiums.
5.2 Financial Market Development
The relative importance of ﬁnancial markets compared with the “real” side of the economy is
different across countries. This in turn is likely to affect households’ equity participation, as
argued, for example, by Ameriks and Zeldes (2001). To examine the effect of ﬁnancial market
development on the demographic predictability of excess returns, we divide the countries into




(domestic market capitalization (US$))
(11)
for each country. The larger the value of the indicator, the less important is the ﬁnancial market
compared with the real economy. Panel A of Table 9 reports the average values of this indicator
for the ﬁfteen countries. The sample of countries is split in two subgroups, according to the
medianvalue. AtthetopofthelistisSwitzerland. Thecountrywiththesmallesttradedﬁnancial
markets relative to the size of its economy is Austria.
Panel B of Table 9 lists the results of the cross-country pooled regressions. For countries
with a low level of market development, d%age65 is extremely signiﬁcant across all horizons,
with a negative coefﬁcient. In contrast, for countries with highly developed ﬁnancial markets,
the point estimates of the d%age65 coefﬁcient are smaller (-5.31 (-2.88) for the low (high)
market development countries) and are generally less signiﬁcant. At the 1-year horizon, low
market development countries are highly signiﬁcant at less than the 1% level (t-stat = -5.09),
while high market development countries are signiﬁcant only at the 5% level (t-stat = -2.17).
Note that the pooling according to social security beneﬁts and market development differ only
for two countries. 7 Hence, countries characterized by higher social security beneﬁts tend also
to have less-developed ﬁnancial systems.
Countries with less-developed ﬁnancial markets are likely to have less liquid, smaller mar-
kets with low stock market participatio different from the US experience (see Guiso, Haliassos
7 Speciﬁcally, Japan and Switzerland belong to Group 1 in the market development pooling, while they were
part of Group 2 in the social development pooling. Consequently, Belgium and Denmark belong to Group 2 for
the market-development pooling and to Group 1 for the social development one.
21and Jappelli 2000). (Note that the three largest stock markets, the US, Japan and the UK all be-
long to the high market development group.) Hence, in countries with less-developed ﬁnancial
systems, the segment of the population holding relatively large amounts of stocks, in particular
old people, are more likely to have a larger inﬂuence on stock prices. In these countries, if the
elderly seek to own stocks, aging populations will likely result in an increasing proportion of
retirees bidding up stock prices, and subsequently decreasing risk premiums.
6 Conclusions
We investigate the link between demographic changes and excess returns in the largest ﬁve
developed markets over most of the twentieth century, and in a larger sample of 15 countries
over the last third of the twentieth century. We pool this cross-sectional data allowing for more
efﬁcient estimation and more powerful tests, and conduct inference of short and long horizon
predictability with robust Hodrick (1992) standard errors.
Our results have several implications for the development of theoretical models. First, exist-
ing Overlapping Generations (OLG) models predict that shifts in age distributions of the popu-
lation do change the relative pricing of ﬁnancial assets, even when these demographic changes
are rationally anticipated. We ﬁnd strong empirical evidence that demographic changes predict
future excess returns in international data, but the US evidence is very weak.
However, the theoretical OLG models in the literature are usually calibrated only to past US
demographic changes, which we ﬁnd is lowly correlated with international demographic expe-
rience. Hence, other countries provide additional cross-sectional data to test if demographic
changes predict excess returns. Moreover, the changes of demographic variables in other coun-
tries is lowly correlated with the US and the degree of stock market participation in some other
countries is also quite different to US experience. Testing the predictions of theoretical models
internationally is also important to check their robustness.
The demographic variables that predict US excess returns are not the same demographic
variables that predict excess returns on other countries. We conﬁrm previous studies using US
data that changes in the average age of the population weakly predict US excess returns. How-
ever, this variable has no predictive power for excess returns internationally. The most powerful
predictive demographic variable for international excess returns is the change in the propor-
tion of retired people, as a fraction of the adult population. A growing proportion of retired
22people signiﬁcantly forecasts decreases in the equity premium, over 1, 2 and 5 year forecast-
ing horizons. Our international empirical results back up the predictions of Abel (2001b and
2003), who suggests that as the baby boom generation enters retirement, and leaves the middle-
age peak-saving years, future realized excess returns on equity will be low. This demographic
predictability of risk premiums by changes in the proportion of retirees is strongest for coun-
tries with high levels of social security beneﬁts and for countries with less-developed ﬁnancial
systems.
23A Data Appendix
Financial data on stocks and interest rates for the annual database are provided by Global Financial
Data (GFD). Whenever possible we indicate the way the historical series has been constructed by GFD.
Population data from 1900 to 1949 are from Mitchell (MI) (1992). From 1950 on, population data are
from Eurostat (EU). Annual aggregate consumption is estimated as the difference between the total value
of the real GDP and the share of GDP that is invested. Data on GDP, Savings and Investments are from
various sources: the World Bank (WB), Jones and Obstfeld (JO) (1997), Bordo and Jonung (BJ) (1987),
Taylor (TR) (1999) and (MI).
Annual Data
Annual excess returns are calculated as the difference between the total return (price index plus dividend
return) on the local equity index and the total return on a short term “risk-free” investment. Data on total
returns are provided by GFD, which combine both current indices that are calculated by national stock
exchanges since the 1980’s and recalculated indices based on historical data for dividend yields and price
appreciation before their publication by the national stock exchanges.
United States: Equity returns represent price plus dividend returns (total returns) from GFD, which are
compiled from the S&P 500. Risk-free returns are total returns from GFD, calculated from Commercial
Bills prior to 1935 and from 3-month T-Bills thereafter. Long-term and short-term yields are from GFD.
The long-term yield is the yield on the 30 year Government Bond, the short-term yield is the yield on
a Commercial Bill until 1914, the discount rate from 1915 to 1930 and the yield on a 3-month T-Bill
thereafter. Population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau, “Statistical Abstract of the United States”,
various years. The real GDP is from JO until 1939, BJ until 1959 and WB thereafter. For the investment
share of GDP we use JO until 1945, TR until 1964 and the WB thereafter.
United Kingdom: Equity returns represent price plus dividend returns (total returns) from GFD, which
are compiled from the FTSE All-Share Index. Risk-free returns are total returns on a 3-month Govern-
ment Bill, from GFD. Long-term and short-term bond yields are provided by GFD. The long-term yield
is the yield of a Consol Bond, while the short-term yield is computed from a 3-month T-Bill. Population
data come from MI from 1900 to 1949 and EU from 1950 to 1998. The real GDP is from JO until 1939,
BJ until 1959 and WB thereafter. For the investment share of GDP we use JO until 1945, TR (1999) until
1964 and the WB thereafter.
France: Equity returns represent price plus dividend returns (total returns) from GFD, which are con-
structed by replicating the MSCI index for all the last century. Risk-free returns are discount rates from
1900 to 1929 and total returns on a 3-month T-Bill thereafter, from GFD. Long-term and short-term
yields are provided by GFD. The long-term yield is the yield of a 10-year Government Bond, while
the short-term yield is the discount rate from 1900 to 1930 and the yield of a 3-month T-Bill thereafter.
Population data are from MI from 1900 to 1949 and EU from 1950 to 1998. For the real GDP we use
JO until 1979, BJ for missing years and WB from 1960 on. For the investment share of GDP we use JO
until 1945, MI until 1966 and WB from 1967. The years from 1914 to 1920 and from 1939 to 1948 are
excluded from the multivariate regressions because of missing data on aggregate consumption.
Germany: Equity returns represent price plus dividend returns (total returns) from GFD, which are
compiled from the CDAX Composite index. Risk-free returns are discount rates from 1900 to 1919,
total returns on 3-month Private Bills until 1952 and total returns on 3-month Government Bill thereafter.
Long-term and short-term yields are provided by GFD. The long-term yield is an average of yields for all
8-15 year bonds, which is an index reported by the Bundesbank. The short-term yield is the discount rate
from 1900 to 1952 and the yield of a 3-month T-Bill thereafter. Population data are from MI from 1900
to 1949 and from Myers and Mauldin (1952) for the years 1939-1945. Population statistics from 1950
24to 1998 are provided by EU. For real GDP we use MI until 1959, WB from 1960 on. For the investment
share of GDP we use JO until 1945, TR from 1946 to 1966, WB from 1967. In the univariate regressions,
the years from 1914 to 1925 are excluded from the sample because of missing data for equity returns. In
the multivariate regressions, the years from 1939 to 1949 are excluded because of missing consumption
data.
Japan: Equityreturnsrepresentpriceplusdividendreturns(totalreturns)fromGFD,whicharecompiled
from the NIKKEI Securities index. Risk-free returns are total returns on 3-month Private Bill until 1959
and total returns on 3-month Government Bill thereafter. Long-term and short-term yields are provided
by GFD. The long-term yield is the yield of a 7-year Government Bond, while the short-term yield is the
discount rate from 1900 to 1959 and the yield of a 3-month T-Bill thereafter. Population data are from
“Japan Statistical Yearbook: 1996” from 1920 to 1996 and from the United Nations Annuary thereafter.
For the real GDP we use JO until 1939, BJ until 1959 and WB thereafter. For the investment share of
GDP we use JO until 1945, TR until 1964 and WB thereafter.
Monthly data
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between the total return on the local MSCI total return
index and the domestic discount rate. Monthly data on discount rates are from “International Financial
Statistics” (IFS) published monthly by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Statistics Department,
except data on Swedish discount rates that were provided by the Central Bank of Sweden. Monthly
yields on long-term bonds are from IFS, following the IMF classiﬁcation for long-term bonds. Annual
consumption is Private Consumption Expenditures from the country table of the publication “Main Eco-
nomic Indicators” of the OECD. For the G5 countries, population data are from the same sources as the
annual data. For all the other European countries population data are from EU. For all the remaining
countries, population data are from the “Demographic Yearbook” published by the United Nations. The
value for the monthly change in consumption and population is the one year continuously compounded
change repeated for 12 months over the calendar year.
Social Development and Market Development Indicators
Data on social expenses are from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (1999). The database contains
social indicators from 1980 to 1997. Data on market capitalisation are from the World Federation of
Stock Exchanges from 1975 to 1998, in US dollars. GDP values are from the OECD database and they
refer to GDP in US dollars (series in local currency have been converted using the exchange converter of
the OECD), calculated at market prices, in nominal terms.
B Estimating the Pooled Regression and Deriving Hodrick
(1992) Standard Errors
We want to estimate the system:
˜ yi




for i = 1:::N countries subject to the restriction that:
¯i = ¯ ¯ 8i: (B-2)
There are K¡1 factors in zi
t. In this Appendix, we derive Hodrick (1992) standard errors for the estimate
of ¯ ¯. This derivation is based on Ang and Bekaert (2001).
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N)0. We can estimate the system in equation (B-1) subject to the restriction that






˜ 0 I ˜ 0 ¡I ˜ 0 :::
˜ 0 O ˜ 0 I ˜ 0 ¡I :::
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where ˜ 0 is a (K ¡ 1) £ 1 vector of zeros, O is a (K ¡ 1) £ (K ¡ 1) matrix of zeros, and I is a (K ¡ 1)
rank identity matrix.
Denote:
˜ yt+k = (˜ y1
t+k ::: ˜ yN
t+k)0 (N £ 1)
xi
t = (1zi0
t ) (K £ 1)
ut+k = (u1
t+k;k :::uN












A (NK £ N)
Using this notation, the system can be written as:
˜ yt+k = X0
t¯ + ut+k;k; (B-5)
subject to C¯ = 0. To write in compact notation let Y = (˜ y0
1+k ::: ˜ y0
T+k)0, X = (X0
1 :::XT)0, U =
(u0
1+k;k :::u0
T+k;k)0. Then the corresponding compact system to (B-5) is:
Y = X¯ + U subject to C¯ = 0: (B-6)
A consistent estimate ˆ ¯ of ¯ is given by:
ˆ ¯ = ¯ols ¡ (X0X)¡1C0[C(X0X)¡1C0]¡1C¯ols; (B-7)
with ¯ols = (X0X)¡1X0Y . This gives us an estimate ˆ µ of µ.
To derive Hodrick (1992) standard errors, we set up the moment conditions of the system in equation
(B-5):
E(ht+k) = E(Xtut+k;k) = 0: (B-8)
By standard GMM, ˆ µ has distribution:
p















The Hodrick (1992) estimate ˆ Sb

















Under the null hypothesis of no predictability ut+k;k = et+1 + :::et+k where et+1 are the 1-step ahead
serially uncorrelated errors. This is the SUR extension of the estimate given in Hodrick (1992).







































Hence, the estimate ˆ µ has an asymptotic distribution:
p
T(ˆ µ ¡ µ)
a » N(0;[ ˆ D0
T(ˆ Sb
T)¡1 ˆ DT]¡1): (B-16)
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29Table 1: Summary Statistics for the G5 countries
Panel A: Summary Statistics
United States United Kingdom Germany France Japan
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
age 42.89 2.2882 43.78 2.5327 44.47 2.7208 45.50 1.2529 43.15 2.5371
%age65 0.1237 0.0390 0.1377 0.0463 0.1429 0.0463 0.1626 0.0278 0.1225 0.0346
%working 0.5561 0.0240 0.5750 0.0219 0.5802 0.0378 0.5781 0.0195 0.5683 0.0528
dage 0.0017 0.0018 0.0013 0.0028 0.0018 0.0024 0.0010 0.0031 0.0029 0.0040
d%age65 0.0089 0.0069 0.0088 0.0078 0.0086 0.0118 0.0052 0.0137 0.0147 0.0164
d%working 0.0013 0.0050 0.0012 0.0034 0.0021 0.0070 0.0002 0.0039 0.0043 0.0055
excess 0.0522 0.1953 0.0366 0.1820 0.0302 0.2624 0.0624 0.2442 0.0689 0.2437
riskfreet 0.0420 0.0268 0.0491 0.0357 0.0441 0.0192 0.0506 0.0315 0.0478 0.0194
termt 0.0141 0.0146 0.0084 0.0172 0.0085 0.0232 0.0113 0.0167 0.0101 0.0188
dconst 0.0328 0.0545 0.0178 0.0492 0.0391 0.0329 0.0303 0.0654 0.0424 0.0421
Panel B: Selected US Correlations
d%age65 d%working excess riskfree term dcons
dage 0.5844 -0.7428 0.1508 -0.4695 0.0557 0.0300
d%age65 -0.5375 0.0536 -0.5815 -0.1503 0.0485
d%working -0.1763 0.3453 0.1591 -0.0602
excess -0.2025 0.1386 0.2358
riskfree -0.3120 -0.1673
term 0.1668
Panel C: Selected International Correlations
Correlation Matrix for dage Correlation Matrix for d%working
UK France Germany Japan UK France Germany Japan
US 0.2924 0.2885 0.3667 -0.2909 0.4497 0.4656 0.1294 -0.5414
UK 0.0294 0.2398 -0.3430 0.6500 0.6285 -0.5723
France 0.2303 0.0991 0.4626 -0.4246
Germany -0.0845 -0.1975
Correlation Matrix for d%age65 Correlation Matrix for excess
UK France Germany Japan UK France Germany Japan
US 0.7283 0.0794 0.3437 -0.5012 0.5308 0.2520 0.3482 0.1411
UK -0.0491 0.2914 -0.4033 0.4624 0.3573 0.1764
France 0.3873 0.0653 0.3080 0.1932
Germany -0.1496 0.0591
Panel A lists means and standard deviations (SD) for age, the average age of the population over 20 years
old; %age65, the fraction of adults over 65 years old; and %working, the percentage of people in the [20-64]
age class. dage, d%age65 and d%working are the log change in age, %age65 and %working respectively.
The values are calculated over the period 1900-2001 (1999 for population and consumption) for the G5
countries except Japan which covers 1920-2001 (1999). excess is the difference between the continuously
compounded total return on the equity index and a short-term riskfree investment. term is the difference
between the long bond yield and the short bond term yield. dcons is the continuously compounded change in
aggregate consumption. Panel B reports correlations of variables for the US. Panel C reports the correlations
across the G5 countries for dage, d%age65, d%working and excess.
30Table 2: Small Sample Power Simulations
10% Nominal Size
One Sample of Length (Yrs) 99 198 297 396 495
Power 0.1729 0.2411 0.3186 0.3921 0.4575
Number of Countries 1 2 3 4 5
Power 0.1729 0.2409 0.3065 0.3700 0.4268
5% Nominal Size
One Sample of Length (Yrs) 99 198 297 396 495
Power 0.1059 0.1577 0.2138 0.2746 0.3345
Number of Countries 1 2 3 4 5
Power 0.1059 0.1561 0.2115 0.2658 0.3146
The table reports the power for equations (8) and (9), simulated for one country and for pooled multiple
countries. We compare the power of successive samples of 99 years for one country in the row “One Sample
of Length (Yrs)” with the power of using pooled cross-sectional country information in the row “Number
of Countries,” with each country having a sample length of 99 years. We simulate 10,000 small samples to
obtain a small sample distribution for the t-statistics.
31Table 3: United States: Regression Results







15.2627 -0.2721 0.8119 0.0286
(1.44) (-0.78) (0.54)
4.9829 -0.3026 1.2989 0.0390
(1.73)y (-0.90) (0.88)








16.6372 -0.0490 0.7305 0.0544
(1.58) (-0.16) (0.52)
4.7043 -0.0817 1.2308 0.0607
(1.64) (-0.29) (0.88)








14.8616 -0.1886 0.4103 0.1322
(1.57) (-1.05) (0.35)
4.4049 -0.2210 0.9215 0.1508
(1.51) (-1.27) (0.79)
-4.0932 -0.2103 0.7926 0.0902
(-1.26) (-1.18) (0.69)
The table lists coefﬁcients and t-statistics for the US regressions over the sample 1900-2001. The explanatory
variables are dage, d%age65 and d%working. These are the log change of age, the average age of the
population over 20 years old, the log change of %age65, the fraction of adults over 65 years old and the log
change of %working, the percentage of people in the [20-64] age class, respectively. dcons is the continuously
compounded change in aggregate consumption and term is the difference between the long bond yield and
the short term yield. Standard errors are computed following Hodrick (1992); the t-statistics are reported in
parentheses with those signiﬁcant at the 10% level denoted by y.
32Table 4: United Kingdom: Regression Results.







2.5711 -0.0687 -0.3361 0.0021
(0.54) (-0.28) (-0.29)
4.7154 -0.0559 -0.9243 0.0360
(2.64)** (-0.23) (-0.84)








1.3292 -0.0016 -0.2738 0.0014
(0.26) (-0.01) (-0.22)
4.0882 0.0023 -0.7952 0.0542
(2.54)* (0.01) (-0.75)








-3.5362 -0.0474 0.6692 0.0331
(-0.91) (-0.39) (0.81)
2.7130 -0.0298 0.0608 0.1009
(2.44)* (-0.25) (0.08)
-2.3170 -0.0563 0.3048 0.0268
(-0.33) (-0.49) (0.50)
The table lists coefﬁcients and t-statistics for the UK regressions over the sample 1900-2001. The explanatory
variables are dage, d%age65 and d%working. These are the log change of age, the average age of the
population over 20 years old, the log change of %age65, the fraction of adults over 65 years old and the log
change of %working, the percentage of people in the [20-64] age class, respectively. dcons is the continuously
compounded change in aggregate consumption and term is the difference between the long bond yield and
the short term yield. Standard errors are computed following Hodrick (1992); the t-statistics are reported in
parentheses with those signiﬁcant at the 5% (1%) level denoted by * (**).
33Table 5: Japan: Regression Results







-13.1233 1.1288 0.0050 0.0951
(-1.90) (1.74) (0.34)
-2.5636 1.1566 0.0038 0.0930
(-1.99)* (1.79) (0.27)








-9.8369 0.4820 0.0094 0.0589
(-1.11) (0.97) (0.81)
-2.3576 0.4829 0.0096 0.0690
(-1.32) (0.94) (0.87)








-6.4259 0.4754 0.0128 0.1654
(-0.73) (1.18) (1.37)
-1.8665 0.4637 0.0138 0.2036
(-1.11) (1.09) (1.62)
2.1595 0.4656 0.0073 0.1364
(0.31) (1.59) (0.76)
The table lists coefﬁcients and t-statistics for the Japanese regressions over the sample 1920-2001. The
explanatory variables are dage, d%age65 and d%working. These are the log change of age, the average
age of the population over 20 years old, the log change of %age65, the fraction of adults over 65 years old
and the log change of %working, the percentage of people in the [20-64] age class, respectively. dcons is
the continuously compounded change in aggregate consumption and term is the difference between the long
bond yield and the short term yield. In the multivariate regressions, the years 1945-1951 are excluded from
the sample because of missing consumption data. Standard errors are computed following Hodrick (1992);
the t-statistics are reported in parentheses with those signiﬁcant at the 5% (1%) level denoted by * (**).
34Table 6: Pooled Regressions Across the G5 Countries.







-4.9610 0.4881 0.0111 0.0196
(-1.41) (2.78)** (1.26)
-2.1154 0.5064 0.0108 0.0279
(-2.37)* (2.75)** (1.25)








-1.1322 0.3184 0.0119 0.0284
(-0.52) (3.56)** (2.83)**
-1.5883 0.3433 0.0125 0.0395
(-1.96)* (3.79)** (3.47)**








-1.2225 -0.0085 0.0074 0.0406
(-1.14) (-0.22) (5.28)**
-1.3416 0.0094 0.0076 0.0663
(-4.45)** (0.25) (6.47)**
1.6662 4.0388 0.1526 0.0414
(1.41) (1.27) (6.16)**
The table lists coefﬁcients and t-statistics for the pooled regressions across the G5 countries over the sample
1920-2001. The explanatory variables are dage, d%age65 and d%working. These are the log change of age,
the average age of the population over 20 years old, the log change of %age65, the fraction of adults over
65 years old and the log change of %working, the percentage of people in the [20-64] age class, respectively.
dcons is the continuously compounded change in aggregate consumption and term is the difference between
the long bond yield and the short term yield. In the univariate regressions, the years 1914-1925 are excluded
for Germany because of missing data. In the multivariate regressions, the years 1914-1920 and 1939-1948 for
France, 1914-1925 and 1939-1949 for Germany and 1945-1951 for Japan are excluded because of missing
data. Standard errors are computed following Hodrick (1992); the t-statistics are reported in parentheses with
those signiﬁcant at the 5% (1%) level denoted by * (**).
35Table 7: Pooled Regression Across 15 Countries







4.5353 -1.8295 0.3468 0.0469
(1.02) (-4.61)** (1.64)*
-4.1088 -1.6330 0.4434 0.0782
(-5.54)** (-4.12)** (2.10)**








4.0460 -1.9366 0.2268 0.1029
(1.20) (-6.08)** (1.25)
-3.7071 -1.7570 0.3235 0.1541
(-5.63)** (-5.47)** (1.73)*








1.8132 -1.3995 0.0550 0.1949
(0.91) (-7.24)** (0.4472)
-2.3052 -1.2556 0.1203 0.2471
(-5.33)** (-6.63)** (0.95)
1.9217 -1.3459 0.0558 0.2007
(1.54) (-6.99)** (0.44)
The table lists coefﬁcients and t-statistics for the pooled regressions across the following countries: Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The sample period is 1970-2000 and the data is
monthly. The explanatory variables are dage, d%age65 and d%working. These are the log change of age,
the average age of the population over 20 years old, the log change of %age65, the fraction of adults over
65 years old and the log change of %working, the percentage of people in the [20-64] age class. dcons is
the continuously compounded change in aggregate consumption and term is the difference between the long
bond yield and the short term yield. Standard errors are computed following Hodrick (1992); the t-statistics
are reported in parentheses with those signiﬁcant at the 5% (1%) level denoted by * (**).
36Table 8: Pooling by Social Security
Panel A: Ranking of Countries
Low Beneﬁt High Beneﬁt
Belgium 1.29 Switzerland 1.97
Netherlands 1.18 Italy 1.73
UK 1.17 Austria 1.71
US 1.08 France 1.64
Australia 1.03 Germany 1.46
Denmark 1.02 Spain 1.43
Sweden 0.96 Japan 1.43
Canada 0.79
Panel B: Demographic Predictive Regressions
Low Beneﬁt Countries High Beneﬁt Countries
Horizon dage d%age65 d%working dage d%age65 d%working
1 year 6.9318 -3.0288 -2.7727 0.8905 -4.6296 7.0535
(1.14) (-2.73)** (-1.03) (0.13) (-4.60)** (1.89)*
2 years 7.7230 -2.4472 -2.3594 -1.1276 -4.1875 6.0736
(1.83) (-2.45)** (-1.16) (-0.19) (-4.33)** (1.57)
5 years 3.7043 -1.7427 -1.2778 -2.8323 -2.4494 4.1371
(1.46) (-2.59)** (-0.82) (-0.75) (-2.75)** (1.26)
We divide countries into two groups, low and high social security beneﬁt countries, following equation (10).
Panel A lists the average values of equation (10) and the countries within each group. Panel B reports
coefﬁcients and Hodrick (1992) t-statistics in parentheses of the trivariate pooled regressions across the two
groups. In each entry, we regress the excess returns onto the demographic variable zt, together with dcons
and term, but only report the demographic coefﬁcient and t-statistic. The sample period is 1970-2000 and the
data is monthly. T-statistics signiﬁcant at the 5% (1%) level denoted by * (**).
37Table 9: Pooling by Market Development
Panel A: Ranking of Countries
Low Development High Development
Spain 4.07 Switzerland 0.79
Belgium 4.89 Japan 1.28
Denmark 5.69 UK 1.53
Germany 5.78 Canada 1.62
Sweden 5.82 US 1.88
France 7.15 Australia 2.55
Italy 10.17 Netherlands 3.01
Austria 19.79
Panel B: Demographic Predictive Regressions
Low Market Development Countries High Market Development Countries
Horizon dage d%age65 d%working dage d%age65 d%working
1 year -8.3531 -5.3152 10.0431 8.6819 -2.8809 -3.9944
(-0.93) (-5.09)** (2.78)** (1.43) (-2.17)* (-1.46)
2 years -2.1119 -4.4127 9.3995 5.7231 -3.4172 -3.7172
(-0.31) (-4.43)** (2.61)** (1.16) (-3.22)** (-1.76)
5 years 2.1971 -2.6421 7.5059 2.0938 -2.5104 -2.6819
(0.43) (-3.31)** (2.13)* (0.79) (-3.60)** (-1.90)
We divide countries into two groups, low and high social security beneﬁt countries, following equation (11).
Panel A lists the average values of equation (11) and the countries within each group. Panel B reports
coefﬁcients and Hodrick (1992) t-statistics in parentheses of the trivariate pooled regressions across the two
groups. In each entry, we regress the excess returns onto the demographic variable zt, together with dcons
and term, but only report the demographic coefﬁcient and t-statistic. The sample period is 1970-2000 and the
data is monthly. T-statistics signiﬁcant at the 5% (1%) level denoted by * (**).
38age dage





















−3 Change in Average Age dage
%age65 d%age65








Percentage of Adults over 65 age65 %age65








Change in Percentage of Adults over 65 d%age65
%working d%working










Proportion of Working Age Adults %working
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The graphs show the trends of demographic variables in the US over the period 1900-1999. age is the
weighted average age of the population over 20 years old. %age65 is the percentage of adults over 65
years old and %working represents the percentage of people in the [20-64] age class. dage, d%age65 and
d%working are the log annual changes of those variables.
Figure 1: Demographic trends in the United States
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Panel C: Fraction of the Working Population
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Plots of the average age age (Panel A), the fraction of adults over 65 in the population %age65 (Panel B) and
the proportion of people in the [20-64] age class %working (Panel C) for the G5 countries over the period
1920-1999.
Figure 2: Demographic Variables in 5 Developed Countries
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The plots report the value of the coefﬁcients (squares) and 95% conﬁdence bounds (vertical lines) for the
demographic variables dage (Panel A), d%age65 (Panel B) and d%working (Panel C) in the trivariate regres-
sions which control for dcons and term, for each of the following countries: Australia (AL), Austria (AU),
Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Denmark (DE), France (FR), Germany (GE), Italy (IT), Japan (JA), the Nether-
lands (NE), Spain (SP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (SWI), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States
(US). The sample period is 1970-2001 and the forecast horizon is 1 year.
Figure 3: Coefﬁcients and Conﬁdence Bounds for 15 Countries
41